Bankruptcy\u27s Exceptions to Discharge: When Does a Statement About a Single Asset Respect the Debtor\u27s Financial Condition? by Ibragimov, Roman
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 9 Electronic Supplement Article 7
3-19-2018
Bankruptcy's Exceptions to Discharge: When Does
a Statement About a Single Asset Respect the
Debtor's Financial Condition?
Roman Ibragimov
Boston College Law School, roman.ibragimov@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roman Ibragimov, Bankruptcy's Exceptions to Discharge: When Does a Statement About a Single Asset Respect the Debtor's Financial
Condition?, 59 B.C.L. Rev. E. Supp. 117 (2018), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss9/7
 
 
119 
BANKRUPTCY’S EXCEPTIONS TO 
DISCHARGE: WHEN DOES A STATEMENT 
ABOUT A SINGLE ASSET RESPECT THE 
DEBTOR’S FINANCIAL CONDITION? 
Abstract: Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a debt 
is nondischargeable if it is obtained by “false pretenses, a false representation, 
or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial 
condition.” In 2017, in In re Appling, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held that a false oral statement by a debtor to his creditor 
regarding a single asset constituted a statement respecting the debtor’s finan-
cial condition, allowing the debtor to discharge his liability to pay the debt. 
This ruling deepened a split among the courts as to whether a false statement 
regarding a single asset is a “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial 
condition.” This Comment argues that a statement must be substantial enough 
to actually provide insight as to the debtor’s financial condition to meet the 
requirements of Section 523(a), and further contends that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s analysis of “respecting” is inconsistent in its application of Supreme 
Court precedent to the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code. 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a fresh start to 
a good-faith debtor in a difficult situation by allowing the debtor to dis-
charge specific unpaid debts.1 Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Code has ex-
ceptions as to what debts are dischargeable, listing them in § 523(a).2 
Among these exceptions is the obligation to pay a monetary debt obtained 
by “actual fraud” unless the fraud is a statement “respecting the debtor’s . . . 
financial condition,” in which case it must be in writing to be nondischarge-
                                                                                                                           
 1 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13), 523 (2012). For example, this fresh start policy may apply to individ-
uals who find themselves in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings. Marrama v. Citi-
zens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007). In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee essentially takes 
over the debtor’s nonexempt assets and sells them to pay creditors. Id. In Chapter 13 bankruptcy, 
the debtor holds on to his or her property and is required to come up with a payment plan by 
which he or she will be able to pay creditors. Id. Following a successful bankruptcy in either chap-
ter, the debtor may be able to obtain a discharge of the debts that were not paid. See id. The term 
debtor in the Bankruptcy Code means someone who is the subject of a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(13). 
 2 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (listing exceptions such as debts for taxes, money stemming from “actual 
fraud,” fraud resulting from a breach of a fiduciary duty, spousal or child support payments, per-
sonal injury from using a “motor vehicle” under the influence of alcohol or drugs, among others). 
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able.3 This exception aligns with the Bankruptcy Code’s long-standing poli-
cy of preventing a debtor from discharging liabilities resulting from fraud, 
reaffirming the notion that bankruptcy is meant for the honest debtor.4 
In 2017, in In re Appling (Appling III), the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit purportedly joined the Fourth Circuit in its 
interpretation of statements respecting a debtor’s financial condition.5 The 
Eleventh Circuit, in apparent alignment with the Fourth Circuit, held that 
such a statement may refer to a single asset instead of the overall financial 
condition, thereby splitting with the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits.6 This 
split has serious implications, in large part because varying interpretations 
of the Bankruptcy Code contradict the fundamental notion that federal 
bankruptcy law should be uniform.7 
Part I of this Comment discusses the facts in Appling III that initiated 
the bankruptcy, the fundamentals of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and the Eleventh 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. § 523(a)(2)(A)–(B). The phrase “actual fraud” was amended into the Bankruptcy Code 
in 1978 and confused the circuits as to its meaning and whether it included fraudulent conveyanc-
es. See Husky Int’l Elecs., Inc. v. Ritz, 136 S. Ct. 1581, 1585–86 (2016). The Supreme Court 
resolved this circuit split on the interpretation of “actual fraud,” holding that the term encompasses 
essentially anything that can be classified as “fraud” and is done maliciously. See id. at 1586. This 
stems from the idea that the phrase must stay true to its common law origins and be given its his-
torically established meaning. Id. at 1590. From that reasoning, the Court held that actual fraud 
includes fraudulent conveyances in which a debtor attempts to avoid paying debts without also 
requiring the presence of a false representation. Id. In fact, the Supreme Court found it nonsensical 
to believe that Congress would intend false representation to be an element of actual fraud when it 
is already accounted for in the Bankruptcy Code as a reason a debt becomes nondischargeable. See 
id. at 1586. 
 4 See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 217 (1998) (holding that a landlord who charged 
tenants rent above the amount allowed by local law and had to pay damages could not discharge 
the debt in bankruptcy because it was incurred by actual fraud). 
 5 See In re Appling (Appling III), 848 F.3d 953, 955 (11th Cir. 2017) (the court specifically 
framed the issue as a split and construed it as the Fourth Circuit on one side and the Fifth, Eighth, 
and Tenth Circuits on the other). 
 6 Compare Appling III, 848 F.3d at 955 (holding that a statement regarding a single asset is a 
statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition and is dischargeable unless in writing), and 
Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1060–61 (4th Cir. 1984) (ruling that a debtor’s statement 
that he owns property “free and clear of all liens” is a statement respecting his financial condi-
tion), with In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671, 679 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a statement regarding 
ownership of property was not a statement respecting the total financial condition of the debtor 
and was therefore not dischargeable), and In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 2005) (find-
ing that a statement respecting a debtor’s financial condition must refer to statements about a 
debtor’s net worth), and In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406, 413–14 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a state-
ment respecting a debtor’s financial condition is meant to cover financial statements). 
 7 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”); see also Cent. Va. 
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 369 (2006) (noting that at the time the clause was adopted at 
the Constitutional Convention, the lack of debate over the clause’s text indicated that the founders 
agreed the bankruptcy system should be uniform throughout the country). 
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Circuit’s ruling.8 Part II of this Comment explains the different positions 
courts have taken when faced with the need to interpret § 523(a)(2)(A).9 
Part III of this Comment analyzes the legal significance of the word “direct” 
and concludes that the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Presley v. Etowah 
County Commission to the Bankruptcy Code was incomplete because it 
substantially modifies the interpretation of § 523(a)(2)(A).10 
I. THE FACTS AND HISTORY OF APPLING AND CHAPTER 7 BASICS 
 Section A of this Part will develop the facts of the Appling case.11 
Section B of this part will discuss the basics of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.12 
Section C of this Part will discuss the procedural history of the Appling case 
from its initiation in bankruptcy court to the Supreme Court’s grant of a 
writ of certiorari.13 
A. Factual Background 
In 2004, R. Scott Appling retained a law firm to assist him with litiga-
tion against the former owners of his company and by early 2005, had in-
curred a legal bill of over $60,000.14 Appling’s attorneys stated that unless 
he paid his bill, they would cease representing him in the lawsuit until the 
payments were made current.15 In response, Appling assured his attorneys 
that he was anticipating a tax return of approximately $100,000, enough to 
pay his legal bill, and relying on this statement, his attorneys continued to 
represent him.16 Appling ultimately received a tax return of approximately 
$60,000, but did not put any of that money towards paying his legal fees.17 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See infra notes 14–42 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 43–60 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 61–96 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 20–29 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 30–42 and accompanying text. 
 14 In re Appling (Appling I), 527 B.R. 545, 548 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2015). Appling bought the 
company from the previous owners in June 2004. Id. at 547. After learning that the company was 
experiencing financial difficulties that the previous owners did not reveal, he sued them and at-
tempted to undo the sale. Id. at 547–48. Appling entered into an hourly fee arrangement with his 
attorneys and after initiating litigation, the bill accumulated to over $60,000 by March 2005. Id. at 
548. 
 15 Id. This representation to Appling was consistent with Georgia’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct. GA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (West 2017). Specifically, Rule 1.16(b)(4) 
allows an attorney to withdraw from representing a client if that client has not paid attorney’s fees 
and the attorney has reasonably warned the client that failure to pay will cause an end to legal 
representation. Id. 
 16 Appling I, 527 B.R. at 548. 
 17 Id. Appling actually did not even request a tax return of $100,000. Id. Instead, he only 
requested about $60,000 and received something a little less than that amount. Id. 
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The law firm that had represented Appling subsequently brought a lawsuit 
in June 2006 and obtained a judgment against him in October 2012 for the 
unpaid attorney’s fees.18 In 2013, Appling filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.19 
B. Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Basics 
Before filing for bankruptcy, an individual must meet Congress’s re-
quirements and file certain forms with the bankruptcy court.20 In 2005, 
Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to make it harder for individuals to 
file under Chapter 7; as a result, individuals must now pass extra hurdles 
before becoming eligible to file.21 Upon successful filing of Chapter 7, or 
liquidation bankruptcy, the debtor’s nonexempt property is sold and the 
proceeds are used to pay creditors.22 All states have certain statutory exemp-
tions to what creditors may take.23 The goal is for the debtor to obtain a dis-
charge, eliminating debt liability incurred prior to the bankruptcy.24 A dis-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Id. at 549. 
 19 Id. R. Scott Appling will be hereinafter referred to as “debtor” because under the Bankrupt-
cy Code, one who files for bankruptcy is a debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(13). 
 20 NATHALIE MARTIN & OCEAN TAMA, INSIDE BANKRUPTCY LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND 
WHY 98 (2d ed. 2011). These forms are known as Official Bankruptcy Forms and include things 
such as the bankruptcy petition, assets and liabilities, and a financial overview. Id. at 98–99. These 
forms must list the debtor’s property interests and debts, whether the debtor is exempting any 
property, and how the debtor plans to deal with creditors. Id. at 99. 
 21 Id. at 99. One of the added requirements is that before filing under any chapter, a debtor must 
receive credit counseling. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (2012); MARTIN & TAMA, supra note 20, at 99. The 
debtor must speak with an approved counselor about his financial situation and evaluate what 
brought about the need for the bankruptcy process as well as how to deal with the debt. MARTIN & 
TAMA, supra note 20, at 99. A court may dismiss a bankruptcy case for “abuse.” 11 U.S.C. § 707(b). 
In determining whether there is abuse, a court must consider whether there is a bad faith filing or 
whether the totality of the circumstances of the debtor’s finances indicates abuse. Id. § 707(b)(3)(A)–
(B). The 2005 amendments added another hurdle to eligibility which qualifies as abuse, known 
among courts as the “means test.” See DAVID G. EPSTEIN & STEVE H. NICKLES, PRINCIPLES OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 42–43 (2007). This was done to force more consumer debtors into Chapter 13 
bankruptcy if they have enough income to pay off a decent part of their debts. MARTIN & TAMA, 
supra note 20, at 100. The “means test” essentially states that debtors are ineligible for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy if their monthly income is between a certain dollar amount. See id. at 101 (contrasting the 
chart on page 101 showing the effects of certain amounts of monthly income on the means test). For 
example, if a debtor’s current monthly income multiplied by sixty exceeds $12,850, the debtor is 
ineligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). 
 22 DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 20 (9th ed. 2017). 
 23 EPSTEIN & NICKLES, supra note 21, at 53. The typical justification for these exemption 
statutes is the benefit of the debtor, the debtor’s family, and society. Id. Keeping certain property 
allows the debtor to support himself rather than relying on public assistance. Id. For example, 
most states have homestead exemptions that are meant to keep creditors from coming after a debt-
or’s home. Id. These exemptions, however, may not apply to creditors who have a security interest 
in the home. Id. 
 24 See EPSTEIN, supra note 22. The Bankruptcy Code does not guarantee a discharge, and 
gives a number of reasons why a discharge may not be granted. See id. at 21; see also 11 U.S.C. 
§ 523 (listing the multiple exceptions to discharge, such as spousal or child support payments). 
2018] Eleventh Circuit Considers False Single Asset Statements in Bankruptcy 123 
charge does not mean that the debt no longer exists.25 Rather, it prevents 
creditors from moving against the debtor to collect on the debts post-
bankruptcy.26 Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code lists the exceptions to 
what debts may be discharged.27 If the debtor receives a discharge, he may 
still be liable for those debts that fall under this section.28 Though the policy 
behind bankruptcy rests on the notion of a fresh start, alternative policy 
considerations for the protection of specific creditors back the exceptions to 
discharge found in the Bankruptcy Code.29 
C. Procedural History 
In 2015, in In re Appling (Appling I), the Bankruptcy Court for the Mid-
dle District of Georgia considered whether the judgment against the debtor 
for unpaid legal fees was dischargeable in bankruptcy.30 The court ruled that 
the law firm’s claim was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A).31 The debt-
or appealed to the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, arguing 
that the bankruptcy court erred in not considering his representation to the 
law firm as a statement respecting his financial condition.32 The district 
court considered whether to construe the phrase “statement respecting the 
debtor’s . . . financial condition” broadly or strictly.33 On the broad side, 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See EPSTEIN & NICKLES, supra note 21, at 222 (explaining that the discharge imposes an 
injunction that prevents creditors from collecting on those debts that were discharged in bankruptcy). 
 26 See id. (indicating that the bankruptcy discharge is a defense to an action for payment 
brought by a creditor subsequent to the bankruptcy). 
 27 11 U.S.C. § 523(a). In fact, there are nineteen total exceptions listed in § 523. Id. Moreover, 
many of these nondischargeable debts are only nondischargeable if the creditor successfully brings 
an adversary proceeding against the debtor and wins. MARTIN & TAMA, supra note 20, at 118. 
Some debt such as taxes and “domestic support obligations” are automatically excepted from 
discharge without any action required by the creditor. Id. at 119. See generally Shu-Yi Oei, Taxing 
Bankrupts, 55 B.C. L. REV. 375 (2014) (discussing bankruptcy and obligations owed to the gov-
ernment by debtors). 
 28 See EPSTEIN & NICKLES, supra note 21, at 63–64 (explaining that if a creditor establishes a 
debt is nondischargeable, it may still attempt collection on the debt after the bankruptcy). 
 29 See MARTIN & TAMA, supra note 20, at 118–27 (giving examples such as nondischargeabil-
ity of debt incurred to buy luxury goods prior to bankruptcy on the theory that the debtor did not 
intend to pay the debt, and nondischargeability of student loan debt stemming from the desire that 
more funding exist for future students). 
 30 See Appling I, 527 B.R. at 556. 
 31 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A); Appling I, 527 B.R. at 556. The elements for such a claim 
are (1) the debtor’s false statement intended to trick the creditor; (2) the creditor’s reliance; (3) the 
reliance was justified; and (4) the creditor incurred damages. Appling I, 527 B.R. at 549 (citing In 
re Johannessen, 76 F.3d 347, 350 (11th Cir. 1996)). 
 32 Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (Appling II), 3:15-CV-031 (CAR), 2016 WL 
1183128, at *2–3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2016). If the court were to construe the statement as one that 
respects his financial condition, the debt would be dischargeable because the statement was not in 
writing. See id. at *3. 
 33 See id. at *2–3 (the court noted that other courts have considered whether to apply a broad or 
strict approach to the issue and that resolution of the case depended on which approach is taken). 
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even one statement about a single asset may be a statement respecting the 
debtor’s financial condition, whereas, on the strict side, such statements 
would have to refer to the debtor’s overall net worth.34 The court found the 
strict position to be correct.35 The court went on to affirm the bankruptcy 
court’s analysis, agreeing that the law firm met each element under 
§ 523(a)(2)(A) to render the debt nondischargeable.36 
The debtor appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and the court proceeded to 
evaluate § 523(a)(2)(A) by means of statutory interpretation.37 The court 
observed that the term “financial condition” in the context of the Bankrupt-
cy Code must mean one’s “overall financial status,” or the sum of one’s to-
tal “assets and liabilities.”38 Notwithstanding that observation, the Eleventh 
Circuit ruled that in the Code’s context, “respecting” means relating to or 
concerning and therefore, a statement respecting one’s overall net worth can 
be a statement about a single asset because it indicates a fact about the debt-
                                                                                                                           
 34 See id. (the court specified that courts are in disagreement over which interpretation is 
correct and laid out both positions with their respective implications). 
 35 Id. (since this was a matter of first impression within the Eleventh Circuit, the district court 
looked to case law dealing with the issue in other circuits and ultimately found the Fifth Circuit’s 
analysis to be the most persuasive in its consideration of the issue). 
 36 See id. at *5–10 (applying the elements and finding the debt nondischargeable). 
 37 See Appling III, 848 F.3d at 957 (stating that because the Bankruptcy Code does not define 
the terms “financial condition” and “respecting,” the context of the language plays a pivotal role). 
The Eleventh Circuit noted that because the Bankruptcy Code is a statute, interpretation starts with 
looking at the language. Id. Notably, the court found the language of the Bankruptcy Code to be 
unambiguous. Id. at 960. As a result, the Eleventh Circuit did not go further than the text to dis-
cuss congressional intent in passing the Bankruptcy Code or the implications of the decision on 
the Bankruptcy Code’s “fresh start” policy. Id. The concurring judge, however, although agreeing 
with the result, actually found that the language was ambiguous and that the language should be 
read with Congress’s intent in mind. Id. at 961 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). Judge Rosenbaum 
held that Field v. Mans, stands for the proposition that “financial condition” is open to numerous 
interpretations and that the Supreme Court had a different understanding of the phrase when it 
decided the case. Id. at 962 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995)). See generally Field, 516 
U.S. 59 (explaining how “financial condition” came into the Bankruptcy Code). Judge Rosenbaum 
then stated that because there is ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase, a broad construction 
would better implement Congress’s intent because most debts are incurred by written statements 
rather than oral ones. Appling III, 848 F.3d at 963 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring). According to 
Judge Rosenbaum, though this would allow more debts incurred by false oral statements to be 
discharged, its effect on written statements are more consistent with Congress’s goals in enacting 
the Bankruptcy Code. Id. 
 38 Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958. The court pointed to the fact that although the Bankruptcy 
Code does not actually define what a financial condition is, it uses the phrase in its definition of 
“insolvent.” Id. at 957–58. The court stated that the phrase should bear the same meaning 
throughout the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 958 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 69 (2012)). Thus, because “insolvent” 
referred to a financial condition in which there are more debts than assets, the court found that the 
proper interpretation of financial condition had to mean net worth. Id. 
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or’s net worth.39 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that because this statement was 
not in writing, it did not fall under the exceptions to discharge in § 523(a), so 
it reversed the district court’s holding that the debt was nondischargeable.40 
In April 2017, the law firm filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court, posing the question of whether a statement concerning a 
specific asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition 
under the Bankruptcy Code.41 On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court 
granted the petition for writ of certiorari.42 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT AND FRAMEWORK 
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision deepens the rift between courts inter-
preting § 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, as almost half of the cir-
cuits have taken a position on the matter.43 These positions can be catego-
rized into two classes: broad or strict interpretation.44 Recently, the First 
Circuit faced a similar issue on an appeal from a bankruptcy case but de-
clined to take a position, electing instead to resolve the case on procedural 
grounds.45 For the courts that have ultimately taken a position on the issue, 
the split is significant because this divergence in application of federal law 
runs counter to the idea that bankruptcy law should be uniform in the feder-
al system.46 
                                                                                                                           
 39 Id. at 958 (citing Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506 (1992) (interpreting a 
statute’s use of “with respect to” to mean “direct relation to, or impact on”)). 
 40 Id. at 961. 
 41 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 2017 WL 
1338561 (U.S. Apr. 11, 2017) (No. 16-1215). 
 42 Appling III, 848 F.3d 953 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 86 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Jan. 12, 
2018) (No.16-1215), 2018 WL 386562. 
 43 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 44 See Appling v. Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP (Appling II), 3:15-CV-031 (CAR), 2016 WL 
1183128, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2016). A broad interpretation would be a statement that only 
concerns one asset whereas strict interpretation requires that the statements concern financial 
statements such as a balance sheet. Id. 
 45 In re Curran, 855 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2017) (declining to make a ruling on the issue as it 
was treading on unknown territory and resolving the case by not taking a position on the issue). In 
this case, a debtor requested $30,000 from the plaintiff and represented that he had title to various 
property for his landscaping business, including a pair of trucks. Id. at 23. In fact, the debtor did 
not have title to one or both of the trucks, and was continuing payments on them. Id. As a result, 
after the debtor defaulted on the loan and filed for bankruptcy, the plaintiff argued that the debt 
was nondischargeable on the basis that the debtor signed an agreement and the statements regard-
ing the debtor’s property ownership within that agreement were statements respecting his financial 
condition. Id. The court acknowledged that the question posed was difficult to make a determina-
tion on and cited to the circuit decisions that took a position on the issue. Id. at 22. But rather than 
joining the conflict, the First Circuit decided that because the case could be resolved on other 
grounds, it would be preferable to avoid the issue altogether. Id. 
 46 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. (“[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and 
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”); see also Cent. Va. 
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Section A of this Part will discuss the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning be-
hind its broad interpretation of statements of financial condition.47 Section 
B of this Part will discuss the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ reasoning 
behind their strict interpretation of statements of financial condition.48 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Broad Position in Engler v. Van Steinburg 
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling put it on par with the Fourth Circuit’s 
position on § 523(a), albeit through different means.49 In 1984, the Fourth 
Circuit, in Engler v. Van Steinburg, found that a debtor’s statement that he 
owned property “free and clear of all liens” was a statement respecting his 
financial condition.50 Although the Eleventh Circuit honed in on the word 
“respecting,” the Fourth Circuit focused on Congress’s choice to use “fi-
nancial condition” rather than “financial statement” to adopt its broad 
view.51 In the Fourth Circuit’s view, because Congress referred to “state-
ments” as a whole instead of the narrow category of financial statements, it 
must have intended such broad interpretation so that any statement that 
bears an indication as to the debtor’s financial condition must be in writing 
to be nondischargeable.52 
B. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits United in Strict Interpretation 
Contrary to the broad interpretation employed by the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits, three circuits have adopted a narrow view of § 523(a).53 No-
                                                                                                                           
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 369 (2006) (noting that at the time the clause was adopted at 
the Constitutional Convention, the lack of debate over the clause’s text indicated that the founders 
agreed the bankruptcy system should be uniform throughout the country). 
 47 See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text. 
 48 See infra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. 
 49 Compare In re Appling (Appling III), 848 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2017) (focusing on the 
meaning of the word “respecting”), with Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1061 (4th Cir. 
1984) (focusing on Congress’s choice in electing to use “financial condition”). 
 50 Engler, 744 F.2d at 1061. 
 51 Compare Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958 (analyzing what the word “respecting” means), with 
Engler, 744 F.2d at 1061 (focusing on Congress’s choice in electing to use “financial condition”). 
 52 Engler, 744 F.2d at 1061 (noting that a statement that the debtor’s assets are not restricted 
may provide the greatest insight into the debtor’s financial condition). The Fourth Circuit actually 
stated that the debtor’s statement would not have qualified as a financial statement, as the phrase 
is typically used. Id. at 1060. But because Congress did not use the phrase “financial statement,” 
that reasoning would not apply and instead, the focus should be on the fact that Congress’s choice 
of language was only the word “statements.” See id. at 1061. 
 53 See In re Bandi, 683 F.3d 671, 679 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a statement regarding 
ownership of property was not a statement respecting the total financial condition of the debtor 
and was therefore not dischargeable); In re Joelson, 427 F.3d 700, 707 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding 
that a statement respecting a debtor’s financial condition must refer to statements about a debtor’s 
net worth); In re Lauer, 371 F.3d 406, 413–14 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a statement respecting 
a debtor’s financial condition is meant to cover financial statements). 
2018] Eleventh Circuit Considers False Single Asset Statements in Bankruptcy 127 
tably, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have employed a similar interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Code to arrive at their conclusion.54 According to both cir-
cuits, although the Code does not define what a “financial condition” is di-
rectly, it uses the term in its definition of “insolvent.”55 Both courts found 
that this suggested that “financial condition” relates to one’s net worth be-
cause the Bankruptcy Code defines insolvent as the difference between 
one’s assets and debts.56 
The Eighth Circuit, in In re Lauer, also ruled that a statement re-
specting a debtor’s financial condition refers to the overall financial status 
of the debtor.57 In that case, the debtor argued that the failure to disclose 
the sale of property was a statement respecting his financial condition un-
der § 523(a)(2)(B), instead of a debt obtained by fraud.58 The court read that 
part of the statute in light of the 1978 amendments that stemmed from Con-
gress’s concerns that creditors were encouraging the use of false financial 
statements by their borrowers to save their claims from potential future dis-
charge.59 The court found that because the transaction at issue was a sale as 
opposed to a loan and the party claiming fraud was not a creditor, but a sell-
er that engaged in common law fraud, the debt did not fall under 
§ 523(a)(2)(B) and was therefore nondischargeable.60 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Bandi, 683 F.3d at 677; Joelson, 427 F.3d at 706–07. In fact, the Fifth Circuit agreed 
with the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning when interpreting § 523(a) for the first time. Bandi, 683 F.3d at 
677 (finding the Tenth Circuit’s examination of the definition of “financial condition” as it related 
to the definition of “insolvent” persuasive). 
 55 See Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676; Joelson, 427 F.3d at 706–07. The Bandi court noted that be-
cause the Bankruptcy Code includes the term financial condition in the definition of “insolvent,” 
insolvent must itself be a financial condition. See Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676 (discussing insolvent in 
regards to financial condition). The Joelson court concluded that because “insolvent” was defined 
as the difference between one’s assets and debts, which is one’s net worth, it must follow that 
“financial condition” itself refers to one’s net worth. Joelson, 427 F.3d at 707. 
 56 See Bandi, 683 F.3d at 676 (finding that a financial condition relates to one’s net worth); 
Joelson, 427 F.3d at 707 (explaining that financial condition must mean net worth). 
 57 See Lauer, 371 F.3d at 414 (referencing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995)) (using the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Field v. Mans to distinguish the debt at issue and render it nondis-
chargeable). 
 58 Id. at 413. 
 59 Id. (citing Field, 516 U.S. at 76–77). These amendments were actually part of the overall 
amendments to the original Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that brought about the current Bankruptcy Code. 
Field, 516 U.S. at 64. In Field v. Mans, the Supreme Court noted that the amendments to the specific 
provision that is now § 523 were enacted as a response to creditors insisting that their borrowers use 
false financial statements to secure their claims from potentially being discharged in the future. Id. at 
65. The added amendments make it necessary for the debtor to purposefully “deceive” the creditor 
who then depends on the deceit. Id. Although false financial statements are not necessarily more 
excusable than other types of deceit, Congress was concerned that creditors were benefiting from 
these practices because creditors were the ones encouraging them. Id. at 76–77. 
 60 Lauer, 371 F.3d at 413–14. 
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III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT INCONSISTENTLY  
INTERPRETED “RESPECTING” 
 Section A of this Part will discuss the legal significance of the word 
“direct.”61 Section B of this Part will discuss the word’s place in the Bank-
ruptcy Code.62 Section C of this Part will discuss why the Eleventh Circuit’s 
position was not actually akin to the Fourth Circuit’s position.63 
A. Legal Significance of the Word “Direct” 
The Eleventh Circuit analyzed the Bankruptcy Code’s use of the term 
“respecting” in “statement respecting the debtor’s . . . financial condition” 
from § 523(a)(2)(A), equating it to have a similar meaning to the phrase 
“with respect to.”64 Immediately, the court construed the phrase to mean 
“direct relation to, or impact on,” based on the 1992 Supreme Court case 
Presley v. Etowah County Commission.65 Yet the court made a key omission 
in its application of Presley’s analysis to the case at hand by failing to apply 
the word “direct” in its reasoning.66 Thus, there is inconsistency with the 
standard set in Presley and its subsequent application in Appling III.67 
The Supreme Court has evaluated the impact of the term “direct” in 
cases of varying issues.68 The word’s presence has signaled the Court to 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See infra notes 64–82 and accompanying text. 
 62 See infra notes 83–91 and accompanying text. 
 63 See infra notes 92–96 and accompanying text. 
 64 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2012); In re Appling (Appling III), 848 F.3d 953, 958 (11th 
Cir. 2017) (citing Respecting, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (online ed. 2017)). The court actu-
ally initially cited to Webster’s New International Dictionary but in its analysis of Presley v. 
Etowah County Commission, elected to use the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition to connect 
the phrase “with respect to” as being the same as “respecting.” See id. (citing to Presley v. Etowah 
Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506 (1992). 
 65 See Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958 (citing Presley, 502 U.S. at 506) (considering the meaning 
of “with respect to voting” in the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and finding that the phrase means 
“direct relation to, or impact on, voting”). Though the issue in Presley was not a bankruptcy issue, 
the Eleventh Circuit applied the definition of “with respect to” to the facts of Appling III because 
both cases involved the interpretation of a statute. See id. at 959. See generally Presley, 502 U.S. 
491 (construing the meaning of “with respect to” in a statute). 
 66 See Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958. The court indicated that a statement about a single asset 
“relates to or impacts” the debtor’s net worth but made no mention of “direct.” See id. 
 67 Compare Presley, 502 U.S. at 506 (defining “with respect to” as “direct relation to, or im-
pact on”), with Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958 (applying Presley, but omitting “direct”). 
 68 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 571 (2012) (holding that a tax on 
individuals that do not have health insurance, although a tax, does not classify as a direct tax be-
cause it is not a tax under the two categories of accepted direct taxes: capitations and taxes on 
personal property and land ownership); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 
618 (1992) (adopting the Second Circuit’s definition of “direct effect” to mean that the effect was 
an “immediate consequence of the defendant’s . . . activity” in the context of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (holding that alt-
hough Congress may not directly regulate the national drinking age, its Spending Power allows it 
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think narrowly about what would fall under its category.69 For example, in 
1978, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., the Court held that the rule espoused 
in Hanna v. Plumer stating that federal law trumps state law on procedural 
matters is only applicable in situations where federal and state law are in 
“direct conflict.”70 Then, in 1992, in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 
the Supreme Court stated that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976, Argentina’s delay in payment on American bonds had a “direct 
effect” in the United States because it primarily resulted from Argentina’s 
actions.71 Moreover, in 2012, in National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court held that a tax is only a “direct tax” if it 
is a capitation or a tax on personal property or real estate.72 Each individual 
issue before the Supreme Court presented its own significance of “direct.”73 
The Eleventh Circuit has even recognized the importance of “direct” in 
its own cases.74 In fact, recent cases have shown just how important and 
volatile the word “direct” can be depending on the context of its appearance 
in a phrase.75 The word may be defined in the positive or negative, based on 
the situation in which it arises.76 For example, in 2014, in Kong v. Allied 
Professional Insurance Co., the Eleventh Circuit recognized that courts 
across the country defined a “direct action,” in establishing the citizenship 
of an insurance company under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), as an action in which a 
damaged party may forego suing a liable party and instead bring an action 
                                                                                                                           
to indirectly influence state drinking age laws); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 
(1980) (referencing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)) (ruling that because there was no 
“direct conflict” between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and state law, the rule in Hanna v. 
Plumer was not at issue in the case). 
 69 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 70 Walker, 446 U.S. at 752. The Supreme Court was explicit that Hanna v. Plumer was inap-
plicable in the case because Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not broad enough 
to encompass the issue faced by the court and as such, did not directly conflict with the Oklahoma 
law in question. See id. at 751. (referencing Hanna, 380 U.S. 460). 
 71 Republic of Argentina, 504 U.S. at 618. The Court adopted the Second Circuit’s interpreta-
tion, which held that an effect is direct when it is uninterrupted by another factor. See id. (citing to 
Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
 72 Nat’l Fed’n, 567 U.S. at 570–71. The Court cited to the United States Constitution’s Direct 
Tax Clause, indicating that the narrow category of direct taxes has been long accepted to be very 
limited. See id. (discussing the Direct Tax Clause). 
 73 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 74 See United States ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 841 F.3d 927, 936 
(11th Cir. 2016) (finding that “direct knowledge” under the False Claims Act must exclude 
knowledge coming from another source); Kong v. Allied Prof’l Ins. Co., 750 F.3d 1295, 1299–
1300 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the accepted definition of “direct action” is when an aggrieved 
party may sue the liable party’s insurer without initially having to sue the liable party). 
 75 Compare Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300 (giving a positive definition of “direct”), with Saldivar, 
841 F.3d at 936 (giving a negative definition of “direct”). 
 76 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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against the liable party’s insurer.77 Because Florida law mandated that a 
plaintiff must first get a judgment against the insured party, the lawsuit 
against the insurance company was not a “direct action” and prevented the 
plaintiff from suing in state court.78 On the negative side, in 2016, in United 
States ex rel. Saldivar v. Fresenius Medical Care Holdings, Inc., the Elev-
enth Circuit did not define “direct knowledge,” but rather focused on what 
it was not.79 The court held that “direct” implies the absence of secondhand 
knowledge.80 Thus, because the plaintiff learned of his company’s unlawful 
activities through information he heard from others, he did not possess di-
rect knowledge of the activities to qualify as an “original source” for pur-
poses of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e).81 In these cases, the Eleventh Circuit under-
stood that “direct” can modify the meaning of certain language, yet did not 
employ that analysis in its use of Presley.82 
B. The Word “Direct” in the Context of the Bankruptcy Code 
The Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly define “direct.”83 Nonethe-
less, the term makes several appearances in the definition section of the 
Bankruptcy Code, in the context of other definitions.84 As noted in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning, where the Bankruptcy Code does not define a 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2012); Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300. Pursuant to the statute, a corpora-
tion’s citizenship is the state where it is incorporated or where it primarily conducts its business. 
§ 1332(c). If the corporation is an insurance company, however, it may be considered to be a citi-
zen of the state of the insured in a “direct action.” Id.; see Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300. The Eleventh 
Circuit noted that an important purpose of the statute had always been giving a plaintiff the oppor-
tunity to get compensation from the insurance company without having to go through the liable 
party. Kong, 750 F.3d at 1300–01. 
 78 Kong, 750 F.3d at 1301. 
 79 See Saldivar, 841 F.3d at 936 (examining how other circuits addressed the issue and con-
cluding that “direct” limits the knowledge requirement of the False Claims Act). 
 80 See id. The court specified that such knowledge would qualify as indirect knowledge. Id. 
The court went on to say that in the context of the False Claims Act, allowing direct knowledge to 
encompass the knowledge obtained by simply reading reports would make the word “direct” 
meaningless in the statute. See id. Giving “direct” an expansive definition would both counter the 
rules of statutory interpretation and result in far too many required Department of Justice investi-
gations. See id. at 936–37. 
 81 See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2006); Saldivar, 841 F.3d at 937. The statute was actually 
amended in 2010 and no longer contains the “direct knowledge” element for purposes of an indi-
vidual qualifying as an “original source” but the Eleventh Circuit determined that the 2006 version 
that contained the requirement governed the case because the activities at issue occurred before 
the amendments became effective. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e) (2012); Saldivar, 84 F.3d at 937 n.1. 
 82 See Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958 (discussing the use of “direct”); supra note 75 and accom-
panying text. 
 83 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (providing no definition for “direct”). 
 84 See id. In the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “affiliate,” the text distinguishes between 
direct and indirect ownership. Id. § 101(2)(A). Perhaps of even greater relevance to this issue is 
the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “disinterested person” because it specifically notes the differ-
ence of a person having a “direct or indirect relationship” to the debtor. Id. § 101(14)(C). 
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term but nonetheless uses it, it should be given its normal meaning.85 Case 
law has shown that “direct” can assume different meanings, depending on 
the context in which it is used.86 The Supreme Court did not feel compelled 
to define “direct” in Presley like it did in other cases, so perhaps its use in 
Presley does not bear a specific and narrow definition but rather just the 
word’s plain meaning in the eyes of the Court.87 
Though “direct” remained undefined in Presley and is undefined in the 
Bankruptcy Code, its plain meaning according to Black’s Law Dictionary is 
“straightforward.”88 By this definition and the court’s analysis, a statement 
respecting a debtor’s financial condition must be straightforwardly related 
to the debtor’s net worth.89 The presence of direct is significant because, as 
the court itself notes, having relation to something does not necessarily have 
to indicate its entirety.90 But “direct” modifies the broadness of relating to 
because it calls for a straightforward relation to the debtor’s financial condi-
tion, which, according to the Eleventh Circuit, is the debtor’s net worth.91 
C. The Eleventh Circuit Did Not Truly Side with the Fourth Circuit 
The Eleventh Circuit considered itself to be on par with the Fourth 
Circuit when it interpreted the issue of whether a statement about a single 
asset can be a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition.92 But 
                                                                                                                           
 85 See Appling III, 848 F.3d at 957 (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 69). 
 86 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 87 See Presley, 502 U.S. at 506 (the court used “direct” in its definition of “with respect to” 
but did not go further to specify if direct had a particular meaning in this context). 
 88 Direct, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2014). The dictionary actually gives five dif-
ferent definitions of “direct,” but of those, the second one defining it as “straightforward” is the 
most relevant, particularly because it is defined in the context of a thing or person. See id. In fact, 
one of the examples associated with that definition is “a direct manner,” the closest example to a 
direct relation in comparison with the others. See id. 
 89 See Appling III, 848 F.3d at 958. This reasoning allows for a statement regarding a single 
asset to be a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition. See id. The key difference being 
that it takes the court’s ruling from a broad to a narrow position by requiring the asset to be of 
enough significance that it can actually provide insight as to the debtor’s overall net worth. See id. 
 90 See id. The court specifically used an analogy to note that documents can relate to an indi-
vidual’s health without divulging their medical records and that articles do not have to quote the 
whole Constitution when referring to it. Id. By extension, a statement can respect a debtor’s finan-
cial condition without actually describing the debtor’s overall financial situation or reveal all of 
the debtor’s assets. See id. 
 91 See id. (stating that financial condition is used in the Bankruptcy Code’s definition of in-
solvent and therefore should be construed to mean net worth to be consistent in the statute). 
 92 See id. at 957. Interestingly, the court separated the ruling of the Fourth Circuit from the 
rulings of the other circuits that have taken a stance on the issue. See id. Although holding that the 
Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth circuits have all held that a statement about a single asset is not a state-
ment respecting a debtor’s financial condition, the court did not indicate that the Fourth Circuit 
took the opposite stance. See id. In fact, it recognized that the issue in Engler v. Van Steinburg was 
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the reality is that the Fourth Circuit never ruled with respect to that issue, 
instead opting to adopt a very narrow position as it related to the facts of 
Engler v. Van Steinburg.93 The Engler ruling was simply that a debtor’s 
statement that his property had no liens or encumbrances was a statement 
respecting his financial condition.94 This is consistent with the above analy-
sis on the importance of the word “direct” because as the Fourth Circuit 
noted, this particular statement may be the most important information 
about one’s financial condition.95 By that reasoning, such information 
would be directly related to the debtor’s financial health.96 
CONCLUSION 
The Eleventh Circuit may have thought it was siding with the Fourth 
Circuit in this split, but it was in fact just making a broad ruling that en-
compassed the Fourth’s reasoning. The Eleventh Circuit did not fully apply 
Presley’s definition of “with respect to” to § 523(a)(2)(A) by not including 
the word “direct” in its application. Case law shows that “direct” may take 
on a variety of meanings and absent a definition, it may be difficult to de-
termine how it applies to the Bankruptcy Code. Nonetheless, by relying on 
Presley’s definition of the phrase “with respect to” as a substitute for “re-
specting,” the Eleventh Circuit should have at least used a direct relation 
standard but instead ignored the presence of “direct.” This seemingly small 
difference makes an incredibly important distinction. While any asset may 
relate to a debtor’s net worth in some capacity, it only directly relates to net 
worth if it actually indicates the state of the debtor’s financial health. Own-
ing property free of liens and encumbrances accomplishes this, as the 
Fourth Circuit held. And indeed, a large tax return may do so as well, as 
was the case in Appling III. Regardless, the Eleventh Circuit’s single asset 
                                                                                                                           
not specifically the question of whether a single asset can respect a debtor’s financial condition. 
See id.; Engler v. Van Steinburg, 744 F.2d 1060, 1060–61 (4th Cir. 1984). 
 93 See Engler, 744 F.2d at 1060–61. The court never framed the question as being whether a 
single asset could respect the debtor’s financial condition. See id. In fact, nowhere in the short 
opinion does the court even use the phrase “single asset.” See id. 
 94 See id. at 1061 (explaining that statement need not refer to a physical financial statement 
and that the debtor’s oral statement in the case was one that respected the debtor’s financial condi-
tion). 
 95 See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also Engler, 744 F.2d at 1061 (holding that a 
statement that one’s assets have no liens might be the most influential information in determining 
that person’s financial condition). This would in fact directly relate to the debtor’s overall net 
worth, following the Fourth Circuit’s logic, because owned assets that are not encumbered may 
very well give one of the best insights into the debtor’s financial health. See Engler, 744 F.2d at 
1061. 
 96 See Engler, 744 F.2d at 1061 (having no restrictions on one’s property is straightforwardly 
related to an individual’s overall finances because property is such a substantial component of net 
worth). 
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ruling was far too broad and a narrower holding would have both preserved 
the ruling and still been consistent with the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, 
because the Fourth Circuit never explicitly ruled that a statement about a 
single asset is a statement respecting the debtor’s financial condition, it 
cannot be said that it was “split” from the others but rather that it simply 
never had to answer the exact question posed to the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits. As such, the Eleventh Circuit may indeed be the only circuit that 
holds this specific position. This deviation from the standard contradicts the 
desire for uniformity in federal bankruptcy law. If not corrected, this split 
may result in disarray among the states under the Eleventh Circuit’s juris-
diction and the rest of the country. 
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